February 16, 2012

Hon. Scott P. Brown United States Senator United States Senate 359 Dirksen Senate Office Building Washington, DC 20510

Re: Freedom of Information Act Request OIG # 12-040

Dear Senator Brown:

This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request dated February 16, 2012, in which you seek "The Office of Inspector General report of investigation, dated on or about July 1, 2011, regarding alleged improprieties by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Marine Fisheries Service, Office of Law Enforcement (OLE) in relation to the procurement and use of a marine vessel in the OLE Northwest Enforcement Division in or about 2008...." Pursuant to a telephonic conversation with my office your office verbally expanded your FOIA request to include a memorandum from the Office of Inspector General to the Department of Commerce Senior Acquisition Executive regarding irregularities in the procurement of a marine vessel in the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Office of Law Enforcement's Northwest Enforcement Division in or about 2008.

A search of records maintained by the OIG located thirty-six pages that are responsive to your request. These pages have been reviewed under the terms of FOIA, and we have determined that the two pages may be released in full. Copies of these two pages are enclosed. The remaining thirty-four pages must be partially withheld under FOIA exemption (b) (7) (C), which protects information compiled for law enforcement purposes, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Copies of these thirty-four pages are enclosed, with the relevant redactions noted.

If you have any questions, please contact me at (202) 482-5992.

Sincerely

Wade Green, Jr.

Counsel to the Inspector General

Enclosures



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Office of Inspector General

Washington, DC 20230

November 4, 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Barry E. Berkowitz

Senior Acquisition Executive

and Director of Acquisition Management

U.S. Department of Commerce

FROM:

Rick Beitel

Principal Assistant Inspector General

for Investigations and Whistleblower Protection

SUBJECT:

Irregularities in NOAA's \$300,000 Undercover Vessel Procurement

Certain investigations we conduct involve irregularities in Departmental acquisition activities and, as such, warrant our bringing them to your attention in the interest of facilitating the awareness of your office and strengthening program integrity. The case summarized below is one such example of significance.

The above-captioned case involves NOAA's procurement of a vessel for undercover operations, initiated by the Office for Law Enforcement's (OLE) region based in Seattle. The vessel procured was a 35' Boston Whaler cabin boat equipped with three six-cylinder engines, advertised by the manufacturer as "luxurious." It was purchased in 2008 solely with funding from NOAA's Asset Forfeiture Fund (AFF) at a cost of \$300,787. In mid-2010 we initiated investigation of whistleblower allegations concerning the acquisition and use of this vessel.

In brief, as reflected in our July 2011 report to NOAA, we determined that despite Departmental and NOAA internal controls, the Seattle OLE office was able to shop for and select this specific vessel, and then manipulate aspects of the procurement process in furtherance of its purchase. More specifically, we found that an OLE regional official intentionally avoided OLE's best practice of vetting vessel acquisitions through its vessel steering committee, misrepresenting the urgency of the procurement need and the views of the local committee representative to suggest concurrence with selection of the specific vessel. This resulted in OLE headquarters officials foregoing committee review and approving its acquisition—prior to required procurement procedures being applied.

While purchase of the selected vessel ultimately followed a limited competition after Departmental counsel objected to flawed sole-source justification, the OLE officials involved created, at a minimum, the appearance of violating acquisition standards and exposed NOAA to potential liability. Moreover, OLE's then-policy did not include authorization of AFF expenditures for vessel purchases; since that time, in response to our July 2010 report entitled Review of NOAA Fisheries Enforcement Asset Forfeiture Fund, NOAA has expressly prohibited use of the AFF for vessel and vehicle acquisitions.

In its September 2011 response to our report on the undercover vessel, NOAA concurred with each of our recommendations, stating it believes "that while the procurement action was arguably legal, it did not meet the spirit of the Competition in Contracting Act or the intent of...the Federal Acquisition Regulation." NOAA's actions include discontinuing use of the undercover vessel (which we found had been used minimally for mission operations, at a high relative cost) and dispositioning it in accordance with government guidelines; requiring vessel steering committee review and recommendations in advance of any OLE vessel acquisition; and strengthening acquisition training for OLE personnel.

You may wish to contact NOAA should you desire additional information regarding the acquisition-related issues and resultant actions taken by NOAA concerning this vessel. We note that the above case summary has been prepared to avoid disclosure of any potential privacy-protected information.

If I can answer any questions regarding this or any other OIG investigation involving Departmental acquisition matters, please feel free to contact me at (202) 482-0300.



OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION		
CASE TITLE:	FILE NUMBER:	
Improprieties in Northwest Enforcement Division	FOP-WF-10-0210-I	
Office for Law Enforcement National Marine Fisheries Service National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Seattle, WA	TYPE OF REPORT Interim Sinal	
Predication		
draft inspection report, last revised in December transmitted to the	involving his summer 2008 bot Boston Whaler Model 345 Conquest cabin feiture Fund (AFF), and on the part of ations about use of the vessel. pparently failed to report the allegations to OLE headquarters provided us with a copy of the	
Background		
NWED is one of OLE's six regions, comprising the states of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho. Organizationally, as of summer 2008, NWED was staffed with a SAC (GS-15 equivalent); two DSACs (GS-14 equivalent)—one overseeing Administration and the other for Operations; two ASACs (GS-13 equivalent); and approximately 15 SAs and 11 support staff.		
NWED has responsibility for conducting enforcement operations pursuant to statutes such as the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA), the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA). Its operations include actions to protect killer whales (known as orcas) from whale-watching vessels in Puget Sound that get too close to and thus endanger these mammals. Until very recently, ESA and MMPA provisions		
Distribution: OIG X Bureau/Organization/Agency Manage	ement X DOJ: Other (specify):	
Signature of Case Agent: Date:	Signature of Approving Official: Date:	
Name/Title:	Name/Title:	
Rick Beitel, Special Agent (Principal Asst. IG for Investigations)	Scott S. Dahl, Deputy Inspector General	

were considered too broad for NOAA to enforce—absent clear injury or kill—without accompanying regulations. Prior to issuance of an enforceable Final Rule, effective May 16, 2011¹, OLE used voluntary guidelines and outreach efforts to protect whales from harassment (e.g., guidelines recommended that vessels stay at least 100 yards from all whales). The Final Rule requires that vessels stay 200 yards from killer whales and prohibits vessel operators from intercepting the path of the whales.

As addressed below, NWED's primary justification for acquiring the UC vessel in 2008 was that it was needed to function as an unmarked surveillance platform to blend-in with whale-watching vessels and inform a responding marked OLE patrol boat of observed violation of statutory provisions and the voluntary guidelines. NWED's rationale was that whale-watching vessels would become compliant when a marked patrol boat was in their vicinity, but then revert to non-compliance when the marked patrol boat departed the area.

Synopsis

Our investigation substantiated, in large part, the allegations regarding misuse of the UC vessel, and we identified improprieties involving its acquisition. Our major findings are summarized as follows:

- violated agency policy and ethical standards by operating the UC vessel with his wife and/or friends aboard on at least three occasions in the summer 2008, each of which involved dockside restaurant destinations during the workweek. The first such occurrence was on the date of the vessel's initial launch. He further violated agency policy by failing to record his approximately 40 hours of UC vessel operations during that period. In addition, he allowed the parents of a subordinate agent, SA aboard another OLE boat while underway (i.e., moving) after the UC vessel experienced engine failure, in violation of policy and ethical standards. SA parents were present for at least one boarding of a whale-watching vessel and a trip across Puget Sound to a restaurant.
- expressed that he considered his use of the UC vessel in summer 2008 to be appropriate because he needed to log hours for vessel and engine break-in purposes, which he described as "sea trials." He considered restaurant destinations appropriate for the purpose of practicing docking, which he said was essential due to the large size of the UC vessel and because it was equipped with a sensitive bow thruster. While acknowledging that non-OLE persons aboard were personal acquaintances, he considered their presence to be appropriate and permissible under OLE's policy, although he acknowledged that may not have been aware as required. Further, he told us that he did not believe agency policy required him to make any record, including in the vessel logbook, of trips made for break-in purposes; that to his knowledge the policy only required logging actual patrol operations. Our investigation found these assertions to be rationalizations lacking validity and candor.


¹ "Protective Regulations for Killer Whales in the Northwest Region Under the Endangered Species Act and Marine Mammal Protection Act," Federal Register, Vol. 76, No. 72, pp. 20870-20890, 4/14/2011.


•	By our calculation, operated the UC vessel over 100 miles for his three known excursions to restaurants during which the evidence shows that his wife and/or friends were aboard, and at least 60 miles with SA parents aboard a marked patrol boat—which included whale-watching, traveling to and from a restaurant, and at least one vessel boarding, which is inherently dangerous. We find no reasonable official purpose was served through such operation of these vessels, including when considering the high cost of fuel, personnel time, and potential liability, and the fact that his approximately 40 hours operating the UC vessel were not logged as required. We concluded that rather than use the UC vessel to train and familiarize other OLE agents and partner state enforcement officers, used the vessel for, as described by one of his non-OLE passengers, "pleasure cruis[ing]."
•	When contemporaneously questioned by was not candid about unauthorized persons aboard the UC vessel, in violation of agency policy and the Standards of Ethical Conduct. Specifically, he told in September 2008 that his wife had not been on the UC vessel while it was underway, and told us when we interviewed him that he did not recall her ever being aboard underway. Based on compelling evidence, these assertions are not true. In addition, was not candid with us about SA parents being aboard OLE's marked patrol vessel.
•	The evidence shows that mishandled mishandled alleged misuse of the UC vessel, to include failing to refer the matter to OLE headquarters for investigation in accordance with OLE policy.
•	inappropriately received reimbursement for nearly \$12,000 in UC vessel moorage, fuel, and other vessel costs charged to his personal credit card between July 2008 and August 2009, ostensibly to avoid compromising the vessel's UC status. Nearly \$9,400 of this amount was reimbursed from the AFF at instruction, which was not authorized under OLE policy. According to the experiment of these charges versus his assigned OLE purchase credit card, because an undercover credit card did not exist at the time and he did not want to risk compromising the vessel's UC status. Was the approval authority for most of these reimbursement claims. When this practice was discovered and questioned by OLE headquarters in April 2009, suggested to allow use of the AFF to pay for UC vessel operational costs. After rejected such interpretation, last vouchered UC vessel costs charged against the AFF on April 15, 2009. The balance of his reimbursements from that date forward, until his final voucher in August 2009, were not charged to the AFF. Cache acknowledged that he may have accrued airline/travel miles in using his personal credit card, but denied that this was ever a motivation for such use.
•	We found that interfered with our investigation. Specifically, at the conclusion of our initial interview of the conclusion, we specifically requested the following of him:
	"Lastly, our request is thatgiven the sensitivity of the matters that we're investigating and the need foroperational security, we would like to ask that you not discuss what

we've addressed with you here todaywith anyone in your organization"	
responded, "Duly noted," but shortly thereafter disregarded our request. Later that same day, according to SA called him and discussed the substance of our interview earlier that day, namely the August 2008 trip when SA parents were aboard the patrol vessel, and even queried SA (whom we had not interviewed) about that trip. also spoke with another agent, SA shortly following our interview.	;
October 2007 memorandum of request for AFF-acquisition of the specific UC vessel misrepresented the views of SA Vessel Steering Committee, contributing to OLE headquarters foregoing review by the Committee and approving acquisition of that vessel—prior to required procurement procedures being applied. The procurement request originated with and wa endorsed by a boat owner and enthusiast, told us he identified the Boston Whaler Model 345 Conquest through undocumented market research, boat sho and talking to other law enforcement officers. While purchase ultimately followed a limit competition after Departmental counsel objected to sole-source procurement, OLE's action created, at a minimum, the appearance of violating the Competition in Contracting Act and Federal Acquisition Regulations, and thus exposed NOAA to potential liability. The procurement attorney who, at the time, objected to NOAA's sole-source justification, told us his impression was that this was "wired from the start to get that one boat."	is ied owi ted ons d
• The UC vessel has had minimal operational use. Its logbook shows that just nine law enforcement patrol operations (i.e., whale patrols pursuant to the Marine Mammal Protects Act and Endangered Species Act) have been conducted since the boat was delivered in Jur 2008 to date. The first such patrol occurred in July 2009—over a year after the vessel was acquired—and the last patrol took place in September 2010. The UC vessel has been operated for a total of just 119 hours through September 20, 2010, the date of the last logbook entry. The logbooks and our interviews reflect that operational time has been limited by numerous maintenance and mechanical problems, including fuel leaks and malfunctioning navigational equipment, as well as based on NWED staffing constraints. Of our initial interview, had not seen the UC vessel in-person, despite it being moored less than a half-hour from her office. Due to its size, trailering is not practical and moorage fees alone cost over \$400 per month. Moreover, fuel costs are substantial due to UC vessel's three large (6 cylinder) engines.	ne s As
On May 31, 2011, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Maryland declined criminal prosecution of in favor of administrative remedies. AUSA specifically recommended administrative action be pursued against and that the Government be made whole for the cost of fuel and time attributable to misconduct involving the UC vessel.	ed

Methodology


Our investigation included sworn, audio-recorded interviews of the we also interviewe other current and former NWED managers and staff, the cognizant NOAA contracting officer, a senior Departmental procurement attorney, and other witnesses. Additionally, we obtained and examined numerous records pertaining to the acquisition and use of the UC vessel, including procurement file documentation, emails, memoranda, and other internal correspondence.	d
Detailed Findings & Violations Implicated	
violated agency policy and ethical standards by operating the UC vessel with his wife and/or friends aboard on three known occasions (workdays) in summer 2008. He further violated agency policy by failing to record his approximately 40 hours of UC vessel operations during that period. He also violated policy and ethical standards by allowing a subordinate agent's parents aboard another OLE vessel while underway.	
a. Wife and friend aboard for initial launch, running out of fuel in canal, and trip across Puget Sound to Bremerton restaurant (June 12, 2008).	ì
• According to a sworn affidavit from Enforcement Technician on Thursday, June 12, 2008, the date of the UC vessel's initial launch at Canal Boatvard in Seattle, operated the vessel with his wife, their friend, aboard while underway (i.e., moving in operation) through the Ballard Locks and across Puget Sound to the dockside Boat Shed restaurant in Bremerton, where they had an early dinner before returning to Seattle. (Exhibit 20)	
account is supported by the account of Seattle Harbor Patrol Officer, who towed the vessel back to Canal Boatyard when it ran out of fuel shortly after launching. Officer told us he observed a woman and two men aboard the vessel at that time. (Officer observation of two men aboard is consistent with the fact that had not yet come aboard the vessel when it ran out of fuel that morning.) (Exhibits 21, 22)	
first-hand account of the trip across Puget Sound to Bremerton is also supported by a credit card receipt from the Boat Shed restaurant, which purports to bear the signature of maiden name of wife. The receipt contains information on meals served that is consistent with account of the number of persons aboard the undercover vessel and the time of day. When interviewed, stated that the signature appeared to be that of his wife, though he said he did not recognize the last four digits of the credit card number as corresponding to credit or debit cards in his or his wife's name. (Exhibits 3, 23)	f








	and orca patrols. It told us he informed her of the vessel's covert status and insisted that it not be referenced in any news story. It also considered presence to be appropriate and in keeping with agency policy based on his status as a law enforcement officer. It additionally considered appropriate, because, according to his services were being provided as part of vessel break-in and he was very experienced. It is serviced and in the considered did not recall anyone bringing beer aboard during this trip. (Exhibit 3)
•	reporter's family member aboard the UC vessel, and she did not recognize the name did not recall seeking her required approval and said she would have questioned the appropriateness of such use of the UC vessel given its sensitive status. However, advised that because it may have involved a possible media story on orca protection, that probably would have been something she thought was a good idea and indicated she may have authorized the reporter being aboard yet not recall it; in our view, this latter statement strains credibility. (Exhibit 4)
c .	Stranded with wife in Puget Sound enroute to restaurant (August 8, 2008).
•	According to by his and a consistent account in a sworn affidavit provided by his and his wife informed and over lunch at Elysian Fields restaurant in Seattle on August 9 or 10, 2008, that they had been stranded very recently one evening on the UC boat in a shipping lane of Puget Sound near Seattle. advised and that the engines had stalled because they did not realize the fuel tanks had to be manually switched and the tank in use had run out of fuel. They may have called the Coast Guard for help, but ended up calling area boat dealers, learned that the tanks needed to be switched, and was then able to restart them. were laughing about the situation, but mentioned that it became somewhat dire at one point because they were in the path of a larger vessel. waguely recalled that may have been heading up that evening to the Everett area to meet SA, whom he described as a good friend of (Exhibits 20, 28)
•	We interviewed SA who advised that the UC vessel was stranded and may have asked for his help, but resolved the issue before SA could get to his location. SA vaguely recalled being underway in the UC vessel at the time enroute to meet him, but said he was not certain. He further stated he did not know whether that evening or any other time. SA acknowledged that he and friends and advised that their wives socialize regularly. (Exhibit 29)
•	We found a 911 emergency call placed from OLE-issued cell phone on Friday, August 8, 2008, at 7:50 p.m. PDT for over 6 minutes duration, with a corresponding record from the Seattle Police Department (SPD), which transferred the call to the Edmonds WA, PD, because the call originated from a location closer to Edmonds, which is north of

Seattle. We also found a Coast Guard record of a distress call reported at 7:48 p.m. PDT that evening from a 40' Boston Whaler saying it was in the vicinity of Jetty Island, which is near Everett, WA. The Coast Guard record states that the subject vessel "fixed the problem and returned u/w [underway] under it's own power." (Exhibits 30, 31, 32)











- 5.6.4.7 <u>Vessel Captain</u>: "It is the responsibility of each Vessel Captain to assure the agency vessel is operated in a safe and prudent manner...The Vessel Captain shall be responsible for the following: Filing a float plan with the area ASAC prior to departure, Recording entries in the vessel logbook..., recording entries in the vessel's service and maintenance logbook..."
- 5.6.6.1 <u>Authorized Usage (1)</u>: "OLE vessels will be used only for official business..."
- 5.6.6.1 <u>Authorized Usage (3)</u>: "A float plan will be prepared by the vessel operator and submitted... for approval prior to departure... The float plan will contain the following information...: Operation Objective, Name of operator and crew members, Estimated time of departure, Estimated time of arrival, Destination and proposed routes, Weather information..., Communications plan (method of contacting vessel), Emergency contact information for all persons on board..."
- 5.6.6.2 <u>Limitations on Usage</u>: "Persons other than OLE employees are prohibited from operating or riding in division owned, leased or rented vessels unless the SAC authorizes an exception or they are: other government employees (state, local or federal)..."
- 5.6.12.1 <u>Vessel Logbook</u>: "A vessel logbook is required for all vessels except small boats without enclosed cabins...The vessel operator shall record the following information in the vessel's logbook for each trip: Operator name, Crew members names, Date and time underway, Date and time of arrival, Purpose or objective of the trip...brief synopsis of the activity..."
- 5.6.12.4 <u>Vessel Maintenance & Service Logbook</u>: "Each operator will record the following information in the Vessel Maintenance & Service Logbook: Fuel purchases, including: date, port & starboard [engine] hour meter readings, vendor, gallons purchased, price per gallon, total price... Maintenance performed including: date, person performing maintenance, work performed, hours of work, All service performed by outside sources including: vendor name..."

- NOAA/OLE Enforcement Operations Manual, Procedure 1.8, Disciplinary System, Appendix 1, including the following:
 - 6. "Unauthorized or Negligent Use of Government [Property]... Use of or allowing the use of Government... watercraft for other than official purposes."
- Department of Commerce Administrative Order (DAO) 202-751, Discipline, Appendix B, including the following:
 - 22b. Government Property: "Use of or allowing the use of Government...water craft for other than official purposes."
- The Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch (5 CFR § 2635 et. seq.):
 - 5 CFR § 2635.101(b)(9)
 - "Employees shall protect and conserve Federal property and shall not use it for other than authorized activities."
 - 5 CFR § 2635.101(b)(14)
 - "Employees shall endeavor to avoid any actions creating the appearance that they are violating the law or the ethical standards set forth in this part..."
- Per OLE policy, bears ultimate responsibility for the evident misuse of the UC vessel, as does when he served as during August 23-24, 2008:
 NOAA/OLE Enforcement Operations Manual, Vessel Operations:

 Responsibilities
 is responsible for the assignment and proper use of all vessels within
 ""
- 2. When contemporaneously questioned by was not candid about unauthorized persons aboard the UC vessel, in violation of agency policy and the Standards of Ethical Conduct. He also was not candid with OIG about persons aboard OLE's marked patrol vessel. Additionally, mishandled alleged misuse of the UC vessel, to include failing to refer the matter to OLE headquarters for investigation per OLE policy.
 - In his sworn affidavit, asked that in about September 2008, asked him whether he knew of any misuse of the UC boat or any unauthorized people on it. told about wife being aboard, but did not think he mentioned the outing with thereafter, advised about what had asked and how






wasn't the case. I said well, is it possible that the boat was tied up to the dock and she was just standing on the boat tied up to the dock? I went through several different questions just to be sure that I wasn't being misunderstood, and he said no, absolutely not, his wife had never been on the boat, but that she had come down to the dock to see the boat, I think, on a couple of different occasions. I think one time he told me it was to bring him lunch and another time it was to pick him up when he docked the boat because he didn't have a vehicle to get a ride home, but he said that she had not been on the boat." [emphasis added] (Exhibit 4)


•	repeatedly told us that he did not recall his wife ever being aboard the UC vessel while underway, but did not make an outright denial as both he and stated he did to her in early September 2008. As such, his statements to us are incompatible. Significantly, he also told us the following:
	"[E]ven if she was [aboard], it wasn't even it wouldn't have been a big deal to me[p]ersonally it wouldn't have been." [emphasis added] (Exhibit 3)
•	OLE's OPR function, along with told us that they were unaware of alleged misuse of the UC vessel until raised during the OLE headquarters inspection in about late advised that referred the allegations to him and told us he did not recall being informed of vessel prior to the inspection. (Exhibits 5, 6, 7)
	When initially interviewed and questioned about the weekend trip to Semiahmoo Resort and who was aboard the UC vessel and marked patrol boat, recalled just himself and SA being aboard either vessel. Shortly following our initial interview, called and spoke with SA called and spoke with SA conversation, he reminded that his parents had been aboard. However, during our subsequent interview, superienced a sudden recollection of this, stating:
	"You know, I do remember somebody. I totally forgot. This would be He brought his parents down to the boat that morning, and they came on the boat, and I met his parents. You know what? They got underway with us that dayThey got underway that day with us. I totally forgot until just now. Just refreshed my memory." (Exhibits 3, 36)
	Given that and SA had spoken about this specific issue approximately two weeks before re-interviewing him about it, we consider foregoing statement to be disingenuous and not credible.
•	told us that though a personal acquaintance, was, coincidentally


and unbeknownst to him beforehand, employed by either the manufacturer or the marine services firm retained by the manufacturer for delivery support, to assist with vessel break-in



Violations Implicated

- evident lack of candor with both and our office implicates violation of the following, along with potential *Giglio* issues concerning his credibility in representing the agency in enforcement matters:
 - NOAA/OLE Enforcement Operations Manual, Procedure 1.8, Disciplinary System, Appendix 1, including the following offenses:
 - 22. "Dishonest Conduct Prejudicial to the Government"
 - 49. "Conduct Demonstrating Untrustworthiness or Unreliability"
 - The Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch (5 CFR § 2635 et. seq.):
 - **5** CFR § 2635.101(b)(5)
 - "Employees shall put forth honest effort in the performance of their duties."
 - **5** CFR § 2635.101(b)(14)
 - "Employees shall endeavor to avoid any actions creating the appearance that they are violating the law or the ethical standards set forth in this part..."
 - Department Administrative Order 207-10, Inspector General Investigations, Cooperation with OIG Investigations:
 - Section 6.02a: "Department officers and employees shall cooperate fully with any OIG investigation; shall not withhold information...from the OIG...and shall answer questions relating to their employment and to matters coming to their attention in their official capacity or by reason of their employment."
 - Section 6.03, Failure to cooperate with OIG investigation: "Department officers and





•	maintained that renting or leasing a vessel for covert purposes was not practical, primarily due to logistical complications such as arranging for one on short-notice. Although OLE headquarters, namely the considered vessel leasing, OLE did not pursue acquisition of a vessel for covert operations through seized vessel programs of other law enforcement agencies. Interagency transfer of a seized vessel likely would have cost OLE only the cost of transportation and initial maintenance. (Exhibits 3, 4)
c.	Procurement request not reviewed by OLE's Vessel Steering Committee.
•	Although the requested vessel would have been OLE's most expensive operational boat, decided not to submit the request to OLE's Vessel Steering Committee, at least in part, as he recalled, because SA the committee, was referenced in the memorandum of request as being in favor of it. (Exhibits 7, 8)
•	SA told us he was not aware of the above-referenced memorandum of request until well after the memorandum had been submitted and was surprised that had identified him as supporting the purchase of this vessel. SA told us he had misgivings about the boat, including its high cost. SA told us he had suggested to that the request for the UC vessel be reviewed by OLE's Vessel Steering Committee, but recalled saying it was his (call and that it did not need to go through the Committee. SA advised that since there was no official requirement at the time to obtain Committee approval, he did not press the matter. (Exhibit 10)
•	OLE's Vessel Steering Committee Chair, told us he was unaware of the UC vessel until after it had been procured and delivered. Although Committee approval for vessel procurements had not been instituted as a formal OLE policy requirement, other vessels had been vetted with the Committee, including a \$306,000 law enforcement-marked 33' SafeBoat acquired by the NWED in mid-2007 for training purposes at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. (Exhibits 5, 11, 12)
	Approval of procurement of specific UC vessel from specific vendor in absence of policy allowing use of AFF for vessel acquisition.
•	On January 14, 2008, paper approved the purchase of this vessel by his signature under a line on paper approved the purchase approved this vessel purchase: paper approved this \$300,000 acquisition in the absence of OLE policy authorizing AFF expenditures for vessel purchases. (Exhibits 8, 13)
•	On January 17, 2008, three days after an approved acquiring the Boston Whaler Model 345 Conquest specified in an and an approved memoranda

of request, the NWED submitted a procurement request for this specific vessel, at the quoted

cost of \$300,787, to NOAA's Western Regional Acquisition Division in Seattle. (Exhibit 14)

	NOAA acquisitions office concurrently prepared both sole-source procurement action and "Brand Name or Equal" limited solicitation using specifications from the Boston Whaler 345. On January 29, 2008, Contracting Officer (CO) sent an email to the Brunswick sales representative identified in the one-page quotation included with and memoranda of request. CO
	email states the following:
	thank you for the quotation for Boston Whaler 345 Conquest with all standard equipment. I'm trying to put together a request for quotation to send out to other potential bidders on GSA schedule. Do you have a list of equipment that's available of the 345 Conquest that you quoted?"
	Handwritten atop the contracting office file copy of above email is the following:
	"PR [procurement request] suspended—no spec[ifications]" (Exhibit 8)
•	On January 30, 2008, sent an email to NWED including the following:
	"Please see attached requirements for the Boston Whaler Vessel. I have highlighted items that this vessel would be required to have for our operational use. Please note that I have performed a market survey and have not found any other vessel that meet these requirements[E]very day of delay will put our vessel delivery date back one week and further delays past the above date may cause and [sic] increase in quoted pricing.
	This purchase is a high priority for our agency, please work closely with to get this order finalized for Brunswick" (Exhibit 8)
•	On February 1, 2008, CO emailed and and stating the following:

"...I'm working as quickly as I can on this request...I received your email earlier with the specifications from Boston Whaler's brochure highlighted and that's what I'm sending out to a few potential GSA vendors." (Exhibit 8)

In addition to providing features and technical specifications, the referenced brochure for the Boston Whaler 345 Conquest included the following description of the vessel:

"The all-new 345 Conquest is the largest, most comfortable and capable Unibond® cabin boat in Whaler® history. Along with the unsinkable safety that only Whaler can assure, this spacious boat is configured for the maximum enjoyment of deepwater fish fighting, cruising and dockside socializing. Best-in-class features that set it apart from others include an integrated windshield and hardtop, a centerline helm and a luxurious interior. This boat provides a smooth, dry ride and exceptional performance. Like all Boston Whalers, this masterpiece is built to last and is backed by a limited 10-year transferable hull warranty." (Exhibit 8)

The brochure specifies the vessel as having a 14-person capacity. Standard features listed in the brochure include a refrigerator, island bed with fitted sheets and comforter, hardwood cabin flooring, a 20" flat screen HDTV, DVD player, stereo with premium speakers, wood table, cedar-lined hanging locker with light, Karadon® solid-surface galley and vanity countertops, electric flat cook-top with touch controls, and throw pillows.

- Shortly thereafter on February 1, 2008, CO issued a Request for Quotation (RFQ), sent electronically to eight GSA Schedule vendors, to "provide one Boston Whaler 345 Conquest or equal." This solicitation was only open for five calendar days. (Exhibits 8, 15)
- On that same date, February 1, 2008, per the contracting office file, submitted a Sole-Source Justification request to purchase the Boston Whaler 345 Conquest from Brunswick at cost of \$300,787. This request was approved by CO on February 6, 2008. (Exhibit 8)
- On February 6, 2008, CO transmitted the Sole-Source Justification to senior attorney in the Departmental Office of General Counsel's (OGC) Contract Law Division, for required review and concurrence since the sole-source request exceeded \$100,000. (The RFQ, since it was a competitive process, did not require OGC review and concurrence.) (Exhibit 8)
- f. Departmental procurement attorney objected to proposed sole-source procurement.
- Later that day, February 6, 2008, emailed CO as as follows:

"I have some problems with the sole source justification:

- 1. I don't understand from the document exactly what NOAA is purchasing the boat for-there appears to be a law enforcement reason for it, but this is not expressly stated anywhere.
- 2. What are NOAA's minimum requirements for the vessel, and why is this exact model the only one that meets the minimum requirements?...The justification seems to praise certain features as desireable, but does not indicate why they are a minimum requirement.

- 3. The first paragraph of #6 is taken virtually a word-for-word from the manufacturer's website. This section does not explain why the allegedly unique characteristics of this boat are the only ones that can meet NOAA's minimum requirements.
- 4. #7 actually contradicts the sole source—it states that other manufacturers do provide features that NOAA requires, and that these are options, which could be priced in a competition.

Overall, the sole source justification needs to more clearly set out what the vessel is for, what NOAA's minimum requirements are, and why only the vessel designated meets those minimum requirements." (Exhibit 16)

• On February 8, 2008, emailed CO with the following:

"I had a teleconference yesterday [February 7, 2008] with the program official, about my concerns about the sole source for the brand name vessel. I explained that a brand name sole source must be justified by calling out the minimum specs/salient characteristics that the agency requires and then explaining, based on market research, why the brand name model is the only item that meets those specs. Apparently, NOAA's main requirement is that the boat be essentially unsinkable if it is rammed. Market research will have to show that no other similar vessel meets this and other NOAA requirements.

did indicate that other manufacturers may provide vessels that meet NOAA's minimum requirements...A competition is required to determine who ultimately offers the best price/best value among acceptable products." (Exhibit 8)


• On February 15, 2008, following revision to the sole-source justification, emailed CO with the following:

"...The new version presented by the program office reads like NOAA found the vessel it wants and it is trying to sell it as the best vessel that NOAA could buy. However, this is not the same as justifying a brand name procurement on the basis that this specific vessel is the only one that meets NOAA's minimum requirements. For instance, the first part is titled "Required Unique Features Only Produced by Boston Whaler Manufacturer." Nowhere in this section is there a statement what NOAA's minimum requirement is—instead, this section just describes the hull configuration of the brand name vessel. The "Supplemental Required Vessel Features" section appears to be just a lengthy description of all of the desireable features of the vessel without much indication what NOAA's specifications are and why the Boston Whaler is the only vessel to meet them...

In general, I can't tell from the lengthy description if these are minimum specs. [sic] or if they are specific characteristics of the Boston Whaler and are stated to show that the vessel is the best that NOAA could purchase...

Overall, I would feel better about this if NOAA had drafted minimum specifications without reference to what the Boston Whaler vessel has. Why can't NOAA issue a limited set of minimum specs. and then use that to justify a sole source, or, if appropriate, go forward with a competition." (Exhibit 8)

g.	Contracting officer dropped sole-source action when Departmental procurement attorney objected, selecting Brunswick's Boston Whaler 345 from "Brand Name or Equal" solicitation.
•	CO did not reply to above email or further communicate with him. Rather, on February 22, 2008, CO awarded a purchase order for \$300,787.00 to Brunswick for a Boston Whaler 345 Conquest. Brunswick was selected over the bid of another manufacturer-vendor for a comparable vessel (at a cost of \$334,000) in response to the RFQ that CO previously issued to GSA Schedule vendors on February 1, 2008. (Exhibits 8, 17)
•	told us he was unaware that NOAA had procured the Boston Whaler in question because he never heard back from CO following his February 15, 2008, email and was left to assume that vessel acquisition did not occur. He was also unaware that NOAA, at the same time he was communicating with CO and and solicited bids through an RFQ. It told us that his impression was this was "wired from the start to get that one boat." He further said he considered the originating request from OLE with the vendor's price quote, approving purchase of that specific vessel, along with NOAA's invalid sole-source justification, to violate the Competition in Contracting Act and the Federal Acquisition Regulation. He advised that even though Brunswick was a GSA Schedule vendor, the high dollar amount involved required competition or a valid, approved sole-source justification.
	said it was clear that NOAA improperly took the Boston Whaler specifications and simply made those their own. He stated that because of the "tailoring to that one boat," the Brand Name or Equal RFQ was "phony" and the award thus tainted. also stated that made a "big deal" about the Boston Whaler being "unsinkable," but, in his view, that was just "thrown in" to justify the vessel and the point was not made. Even had there been a valid sole-source justification, NOAA's Acquisitions office would still have needed to issue a formal solicitation to the vendor. He stated that the circumstances surrounding this acquisition would not have insulated NOAA against a bid protest or other complaint from a vendor. In noted that he has encountered problems in the past with CO and NOAA's office looking to cut corners. (Exhibit 17)
•	CO told us that did not approve the sole-source justification, but he did not expect to do so, which is why he concurrently issued the "Brand Name or Equal" RFQ to potential GSA offerors and properly made the award on that basis. It was not a "Full and Open Competition," but still a competition in how it was advertised and given that quotes from two vendors were received and considered. As such, he did not need



Violations Implicated

• OLE's documented approval for the \$300,787 AFF-funded purchase of Brunswick's Boston Whaler 345 Conquest, creates, at a minimum, the appearance of violating the Competition in Contracting Act and Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) 1.102-2(c) and 11.105. The Act and FAR require that executive agencies use full and open competition unless circumstances permit limited competition or a sole source procurement. See 41 U.S.C. § 253(a)(1)(A)-(B); see also FAR 6.302, 8.405-6 (circumstances permitting other than full and open competition). But, to use sole-source procurement, the agency must have valid sole-source justification in place—in advance of any agency action indicating approval such as occurred in this case.

In the limited competition that resulted in the procurement of the \$300,787 Brunswick Boston Whaler 345 Conquest, justification for the Brand Name or Equal RFQ appeared to have been tailored to the specifications of the Boston Whaler. In our judgment, there is no indication that this particular Boston Whaler was "essential" to NOAA OLE's law enforcement program as required by FAR which states that agency requirements shall not be written so as to require a particular brand name "...unless the particular brand name, product, or feature is essential to the Government's requirements..."

See FAR 8.405-6(b)(1), 11-105(a)(1). Based on the foregoing, the actions of were contrary to the following FAR guiding principles with respect to performance standards:

- FAR 1.102-2(c)(1):

"[Participants in Government acquisitions must] conduct business with integrity, fairness, and openness...An essential consideration in every aspect of the [Federal Acquisition Regulation System] is maintaining the public's trust...accordingly, each [participant in Government acquisitions] is responsible and accountable for the wise use of public resources as well as acting in a manner which maintains the public's trust..."

and vessel-specific procurement request, as approved by the subjected NOAA to risk of a bid protest or other complaint that NOAA's limited competition was a sham because OLE had already selected the vendor. Their actions implicate violation of the Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch (5 CFR § 2635 et. seq.), including the following provisions:

- 5 CFR § 2635.101(b)(8)

"Employees shall act impartially and not give preferential treatment to any private organization or individual."

- 5 CFR § 2635.101(b)(14)

"Employees shall endeavor to avoid any actions creating the appearance that they are violating the law [i.e., the Competition in Contracting Act and Federal Acquisition Regulation] or the ethical standards set forth in this part..."

Moreover, OLE policy did not include authorization of AFF expenditures for vessel purchases:

a. Inappropriate use of personal credit card for nearly \$12,000 in vessel operating

- OLE National Directive No. 53, entitled "Asset Forfeiture Fund--Preapprovals," dated March 2, 1998, which lists 43 categories of items approved for AFF expenditure, does not include authorization for vessel purchase or other costs. (Exhibit 13)

4. Other Relevant Findings:

analyst

	costs. Nearly \$9,400 of these costs were charged to the AFF, which was not authorized by OLE policy.
•	Over a period of 12 months, UC vessel moorage, fuel, cleaning, and maintenance costs that he charged to his personal credit card between July 2008 and August 2009, ostensibly to maintain the vessel's UC status. Told us he used his personal credit card for these charges, versus his assigned OLE credit card, because an NWED undercover credit card did not exist at the time and he did not want to risk compromising the vessel's UC identity. He acknowledged that he may have accrued airline/travel miles by virtue of using his personal credit card, but denied that this was ever a motivation for such use. The provided most of these reimbursement claims, following what the personal credit card on an interimal basis for such charges and file claims for reimbursement. Nonetheless, we conclude that year-long use of his personal credit card for such costs was inappropriate given that NWED could readily have obtained an undercover credit or debit card. (Exhibits 3, 4, 45)
•	Nearly \$9,400 of the above amount for which charged to the AFF. When discovered by OLE headquarters in April 2009, budget officer, included the following in an email reply to OLE headquarters

"... has been using his personal credit card to pay vendors for the undercover vessel expenses as he is concerned about maintaining the covert nature of that vessel. When we received delivery from the manufacturer, he specifically told me not to obtain a government fleet [credit] card for that reason..." (Exhibit 46)

•	OLE	subsequently	addressed this issue	with	
	including the following in an e	mail to	and	dated April 2	23, 2009:

"...[OLE] National Directive 91 prohibits the use of the [Asset Forfeiture] Fund to pay for expenses associated with "routine patrols". Therefore, absent a specific target and sufficient information that results in the initiation of an investigation, [AF] fund can not be used to pay for the operating cost of the undercover vessel...

"I do not agree we should pay normal operating cost for the undercover vessel not specifically associated with an investigation from [AF] fund. Such a practice masks our costs of operations and, in my opinion, complicates and jeopardizes our ability to obtain sufficient funds to operate. In my opinion, routine maintenance, routine moorage, etc. should be funded through base [appropriated funds]..." (Exhibit 46)

In reply, suggested to that a constructive interpretation of OLE policy be considered to use the AFF to pay for UC vessel operational costs. email reply on April 23, 2009, included the following:

"...The [UC] vessel in of itself is inherently only for special operations use in the furtherance of an investigation and given the covert nature of the vessel concealment of ownership through a means of disguise is in furtherance of special operations whether planned or un-planned. It is not intended to ever be used for random patrol or boarding activity. Therefore could we use the [AF] fund in the same manner as if I were to be renting space for a store front in covert nature that was designed to further a covert investigation...And if we agree that the "covert rent" [i.e., moorage] is inherently part of a covert investigation could we not draft an internal directive specific to this operational need that would not necessarily be related to just one single case number but rather a blanket investigative mission description for audit purposes of the [AF] fund?

I truly do not know the answer to this but is [sic] seems comparable and I am willing to follow whatever we determine to be the most appropriate funding code for this vessel." (Exhibit 46)


- last vouchered UC vessel costs charged against the AFF on April 15, 2009. The balance of his reimbursements from that date forward, until his final voucher in August 2009, were not charged to the AFF. (Exhibit 45)
- told us that the AFF be charged for UC vessel moorage and other costs. In the UC vessel was purchased using the AFF, associated operational costs should similarly be charged to the AFF. (Exhibit 47)

Violations Implicated

- As reflected above, improperly charged routine UC vessel costs to the AFF, implicating violation of the following:
 - OLE National Directive No. 91, entitled "Asset Forfeiture Fund-Patrols":

- "...The [Magnuson-Stevens Act] language requires reimbursement for expenditures directly related to investigations. As a matter general policy, OLE does not consider routine patrols as "directly related to investigations" therefore, they are not [AF] fundable. Travel to respond to complaints, allegations, or intelligence reports MAY be charged to the [AF] Fund. If a routine patrol results in a specific violation which requires further travel expenditures these expenses are [AF] fundable..." (Exhibit 13)
- OLE National Directive No. 53, entitled "Asset Forfeiture Fund--Preapprovals," which lists 43 categories of items approved for AFF expenditure, does not include authorization for any vessel costs. (Exhibit 13)

b. Interference with OIG investigation.



"Lastly, our request is that...given the sensitivity of the matters that we're investigating and the need for...operational security, we would like to ask that you not discuss what we've addressed with you here today...with anyone in your organization..."

responded, "Duly noted." but shortly thereafter disregarded our request.
Later that same day, according to SA called him and discussed the
substance of our interview earlier that day, namely the August 2008 trip to the Semiahmoo
Resort, and even queried SA (who had not been interviewed) about that trip.
also spoke with SA shortly following our interview. (Exhibits 3, 29
36)

Violations Implicated

- Based on our specific request and his position as a senior law enforcement manager and criminal investigator, with ability to recognize the importance of our request, actions implicate violation of the following:
 - Department Administrative Order 207-10, Inspector General Investigations, Cooperation with OIG Investigations:
 - Section 6.03, Failure to cooperate with OIG investigation: "Department officers and employees who refuse to...otherwise cooperate with an OIG investigation may be disciplined."
 - Department Organization Order 10-13, Departmental Policies:
 - Section 4.01: "The officers and employees of the Department shall cooperate fully with the officials and employees of the OIG and shall provide such information, assistance,

and support as is needed for the OIG to properly carry out the provisions of the [Inspector General] Act."

c. Improper loan of marked patrol vessel to County Sheriff's Office.

• By Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated June 2008 and Sheriff of Whatcom County, WA, entered into an arrangement whereby NWED indefinitely loaned its 27-foot Boston Whaler "Short Raker" marked patrol boat in Bellingham to the full-time custody of the Whatcom County Sheriff's Office (WCSO), for regular use by that locality. This vessel remains in WCSO's custody to date. This arrangement and MOA were not vetted with, and approved by, OLE headquarters, nor reviewed by agency counsel relative to such critical considerations as operational responsibility and liability.

told us proposed the agreement and it seemed like a good idea. (Exhibits 3, 4, 48)

Violation Implicated

- vessel loan arrangement with the Whatcom County Sheriff implicates violation of the following:
 - Department of Commerce Personal Property Management Manual, Section 2.202, Loan Arrangements with Non-Federal Agencies: "...Loans can be made to local non-federal institutions only in emergencies involving threat to human life or prevention of suffering, until institutions have a reasonable opportunity for the institutions to obtain replacement property."

d. Minimal operational use of UC vessel to date.

• The UC vessel's operations logbook shows that just nine law enforcement patrol operations (i.e., whale patrols pursuant to the Marine Mammal Protection Act and Endangered Species Act) have been conducted since the boat was delivered in June 2008 to date. The first such patrol occurred in July 2009—over a year after the vessel was acquired—and the last patrol took place in September 2010.

•	The UC vessel was operated for a total of just 119 hours through September 20, 2010, the
	date of the last logbook entry. At the time of its transfer from to
	in Sentember 2008, the vessel had been operated for approximately 40 hours, which
	failed to log. The logbooks and our interviews reflect that operational time has been
1	limited by numerous maintenance and mechanical problems, including fuel leaks and
	malfunctioning navigational equipment, as well as based on NWED staffing constraints. As
	of our initial interview, had not seen the UC vessel in-person, despite it being
	moored less than a half-hour from her office. (Exhibits 4, 49, 50)

e. Engine failure (explosion) attributable to operator error.

•	On Friday, August 22, 2008, while enroute to the Semiahmoo Resort in Blaine, WA
	(addressed in 2d above), the UC vessel experienced catastrophic failure (explosion) of its
	port engine, necessitating replacement. This failure was found to be consequent to operator
	error; specifically, an incident that occurred on the UC vessel's last operation on about
	August 14, 2008, during which, as the vessel abruptly slowed coming off of plane,
	inadvertently shifted the throttle into reverse, causing water ingestion in the port
	engine. Although Clearwater Marine of Bellingham pumped out the water and the engine
	was restarted, Clearwater Marine concluded that this incident precipitated the catastrophic
	failure during the vessel's next operation. Of Clearwater Marine, who interacted
	solely with on this matter, advised us that was candid about how
	the water ingestion occurred. Despite the finding of operator error. Mercury replaced the
	engine, costing approximately \$10,000, under warranty, which advised was done
	in the interest of good customer relations. (Exhibit 51)


Prosecutorial Determination

On May 31, 20 <u>11, the</u>	U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Maryla	and declined criminal			
prosecution of	in favor of administrative remedies. AUS	SA			
specifically recommen	nded administrative action be pursued against	and that the			
Government be made whole for the cost of fuel and time attributable to reported					
misconduct involving	the UC vessel. (Exhibit 52)				


19. Interview of

13/10.


Index of Exhibits



Brunswick Commercial and Government Products, Inc.: 5/12-



51. Interview of



52. Prosecutorial declination, U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Maryland: 5/31/11.

Clearwater Marine: 5/12/10.